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Abstract 
 
This essay considers how Neal Stephenson’s 1999 epic novel Cryptonomicon engages with 
the long-standing and complex relationship between cryptology and national/transnational 
identity. Cryptonomicon's layered and disjointed structure allows it to explore the impact of 
cryptography and cryptanalysis in the Second World War (as well as their impact on the 
consequent rewriting of the international political stage), to reflect on the place of 
technology in the recent history of cryptology, and to consider how emergent (and 
supposedly secure) data storage technologies not only open up planetary-wide 
communication traffic but also unsettle the agreed protocols of national and international 
law. 
 
Stephenson provides a sense of technology's global effects by offering not a straightforward 
narrative of the demise of the nation-state but by showing how technologies are in a process 
of constant negotiation with the institutions of the nation-state, drawing upon the economic, 
material, and intellectual resources of the nation state, while at the same time challenging 
notions of a bordered and coherent national identity and working to disestablish nations of 
their regulatory authority. The essay is informed by recent work on cryptology, data 
havens, globalization, transnationalism, and postcoloniality, as well as Derrida's work on 
archives and technology. 
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Credited by some as a more compelling and engaged response to the information age than 
the other heavyweights that tend to dominate postmodernity’s novelistic horizons (Garner, 
1999), Neal Stephenson’s 1999 novel Cryptonomicon works on an epic scale that resists 
easy synopsis. Its geographical landscape is a global one, with characters ranging across 
China, Japan, the Philippines, Sweden, the UK, and the USA. Its sense of history is 
elaborately bifurcated, shuttling between the Second World War and the 1990s it traces the 
roots of the dotcom era to the information war of the 1940s. Its cast of dramatis personae is 
a lengthy one, although much of the narrative moves (with a logic that sometimes stretches 
credulity) between three central figures: Lawrence Waterhouse, a PhD student in maths at 
Princeton who enters the Second World War and soon becomes one of the Allies’ key 
figures in the intelligence war; Randy Waterhouse (grandson of Lawrence), erstwhile 
librarian and UNIX autodidact, who becomes the chief software engineer in a telecoms 
venture for migrant Filipino workers, and who finally – incredibly - discovers Japan’s lost 
war gold; and Bobby Shaftoe, a gung-ho marine and grandfather to rogue marine services 
contractor America (Amy) Shaftoe, who later becomes Randy’s girlfriend. Gathered around 
this central cast is a large company of extras; the presence of many of these supplementary 
characters – such as Alan Turing, General MacArthur, Admiral Yamamoto, Albert 
Einstein, Winston Churchill, and Ronald Reagan – could easily seduce Stephenson’s 
readers into treating this text as historical fiction. 
Stephenson’s text is fascinated by technology and much of it is devoted to situating 
technoculture not in the closing years of the twentieth century, but in a longer history that 
has been largely unwritten. However, as much as Cryptonomicon seeks to establish the 
shaping of the present by technologies of the recent past, and as much as it finds 
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programmers, computer scientists, and hackers (such as Turing and Lawrence Waterhouse) 
to be the unacknowledged heroes of the twentieth century, this text cannot be placed firmly 
in the category of documentary revisionism. Often – almost invisibly – Cryptonomicon 
refuses the accepted protocols of historical fiction, to the extent that recognition of 
technology’s cultural centrality here takes place in a narrative that works against the secure 
transmission of information and becomes conceptually vertiginous. Indeed, Cryptonomicon 
encourages readers to treat its claims to accuracy with suspicion by including, in its 
seemingly reliable history of the information wars, a fictional work that is itself entitled 
Cryptonomicon.  
This essay will consider Cryptonomicon’s documenting of technology’s unwritten 
history, focusing in particular on the ways in which this novel charts the emergence of the 
data haven at the end of the twentieth century and traces the roots of this apparently new 
technology both to earlier archival technologies and to cryptographic attempts to secure 
information. What Cryptonomicon reveals, in its almost encyclopedic treatment of data 
havens’ dependence on cryptology, is a strange reshaping of both communication and the 
nation-state. Language here functions simultaneously as a reliable and insecure medium of 
information exchange, and the nation-state is seen to be a mode of territorial distinctiveness 
that is at once essential to and threatened by new technological systems. 
 
Unbreakable encryption? 
Cryptonomicon’s narrative constantly gravitates towards the manipulation of information, 
especially the interfacing of the human intellect with the computer in both the encryption 
and decryption of individual, corporate, and state secrets. Long sequences of the novel are 
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often given over to disquisitions on the encoding and decoding of personal, commercial, 
political, and military information. Early in the novel, for example, readers are introduced 
to Novus Ordo Seclorum (abbreviated to Ordo), Randy’s preferred software for encrypting 
emails to Avi, his business partner in Epiphyte Corp.1 One of Ordo’s strengths, we are told, 
lies in its ability to generate encryption keys that are of unlimited length: 
 
Randy pulls down a menu and picks an item labeled: ‘New key…’ 
A box pops up giving him several KEY LENGTH options: 768 bits, 1024, 
1536, 2048, 3072, or Custom. Randy picks the latter option and then, 
wearily, types in 4096. 
Even a 768-bit key requires vast resources to break. Add one bit, to 
make it 769 bits long, and the number of possible keys doubles, the problem 
becomes much more difficult. A 770-bit key is that much more difficult yet, 
and so on. By using 768-bit keys, Randy and Avi could keep their 
communications secret from nearly every entity in the world for at least the 
next several years. A 1024-bit key would be vastly, astronomically more 
difficult to break. 
Some people go so far as to use keys 2048 or even 3072 bits in 
length. These will stop the very best codebreakers on the face of the earth 
for astronomical periods of time, barring the invention of otherworldly 
technologies such as quantum computers. Most encryption software – even 
stuff written by extremely security-conscious cryptography experts – can’t 
even handle keys larger than that. But Avi insists on using Ordo, generally 
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considered the best encryption software in the world, because it can handle 
keys of unlimited length—as long as you don’t mind waiting for it to crunch 
all the numbers. 
… 
Randy is trying to generate one that is ridiculously long. He has 
pointed out to Avi, in an encrypted e-mail message, that if every particle of 
matter in the universe could be used to construct one single cosmic 
supercomputer, and this computer was put to work trying to break a 4096-bit 
encryption key, it would take longer than the lifespan of the universe 
(Stephenson, 2000, pp. 53-4). 
 
What Ordo brings to the history of code-making, then, is a mode of encryption that is more 
virtual and machinic than it is human: all that Ordo requires from Randy is an arbitrary 
sequence of key strikes, from which it generates the random numbers that then constitute 
the encryption algorithm. Randy is, in other words, effectively removed from the process of 
translation that makes his emails incomprehensible to anyone other than their intended 
recipients; instead he becomes simply an instrument which allows Ordo to carry out the 
more rigorous work of thinking. 
 Perhaps more important than the question of Randy’s relegation to technology’s 
appurtenance is the question of perfectible communication that Ordo raises. Offering Randy 
and Avi a mode of encryption that would take nearly an infinity to break, Ordo seems 
finally to realize the long-held belief that an unbreakable code is effectively possible. 
Robert Churchhouse (2002) opens his Codes and Ciphers with the observation that ‘For at 
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least two thousand years there have been people who wanted to send messages that could 
only be read by the people for whom they were intended’ (1), and the various modes of 
concealment and encipherment that developed during this period have been based upon the 
assumption that they could resist decipherment and disclosure. From Caesar’s simple 
substitution cipher (which replaces each letter in a message with one that is three places 
after it in the alphabet) to PGP (Pretty Good Privacy – highly secure freeware for data 
encryption and verification), cryptography has acquired greater sophistication and taken on 
greater prominence in everyday communication.2 This history of cryptography has, 
however, been a history of secrets deciphered, since the most complex codes of the past 
now appear elementary and even the most secure codes of today (such as PGP) are thought 
by some to have been broken by the US Government. One reading of Cryptonomicon might 
find in Ordo a method of encoding that finally overcomes cryptography’s difficult history: 
Ordo remains apparently secure throughout the novel, and it is this secure exchange of 
information that allows Randy’s hacker nonconformism (as well as Avi’s entrepreneurial 
flair) to flourish in a business environment left arid by governmental surveillance and 
corporate espionage. Cryptonomicon suggests, in other words, that communication between 
two parties has, in the past, been corruptible by an intrusive third party; what new 
technologies now allow is an unprecedented level of confidence in language as a private 
medium which can guarantee the legitimacy of expression.   
 
A new history of technology 
Importantly, Cryptonomicon’s sense of history is neither a straightforwardly linear nor an 
epochal one, since it refuses either to reaffirm the idea that the technological present 
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smoothly builds on technologies of the recent past or to endorse the notion that we now 
inhabit a technologized ‘end of history’ which overcomes the failures of the pre-
technological past. As much as this novel often constructs Randy and his associates as the 
beneficiaries of a newly technologized and global order, it sees this order as one which has 
neither shaken off the limitations of antecedent technologies nor entered an unprecedented 
age of technologized - posthuman – enlightenment. In this respect, the novel echoes 
Siegfried Zielinski’s claim that ‘media worlds’ are not distributed sequentially, but 
‘combine at particular moments in time, collide with each other, provoke one another, and, 
in this way, maintain tension and movement within developing processes’ (Zielinski, 2006, 
p. 258). 
Three examples from the novel demonstrate this departure from both evolutionary 
and epochal historiography. First, software. Ordo certainly functions mostly by removing 
human involvement and by operating with almost complete autonomy in its encryption of 
data. But this novel does not, unlike some recent accounts of the machinic reconstruction of 
consciousness and the body, suggest that the human is, in its greater association with 
technology, entering its terminal phase. Although advanced encipherment might well 
depend upon tools such as Ordo, these tools are also seen to require human collaboration, 
with cryptology being possible only as the result of a complex interfacing of machines, 
software, and human intelligence. For instance, when Randy is working on the Arethusa 
cipher – the code which, when broken, leads him to the mine housing Japan’s war gold – 
we read: 
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Unlike human codebreakers, computers can’t read English. They can’t even 
recognize it. They can crank out possible decrypts of a message at tremendous 
speed but given two character strings like 
SEND HELP IMMEDIATELY 
and 
XUEBP TOAFF NMQPT 
they have no inherent ability to recognize the first as a successful decryption 
of a message and the second as a failure (Stephenson, 2000, p. 824). 
 
Cryptonomicon, in other words, finds both the past (Lawrence Waterhouse’s information 
war) and the present (Randy Waterhouse’s information economy) to be simultaneously 
machinic and human, since even the most advanced software does not fully supplant the 
human.  
Second: hardware. As much as Cryptonomicon seems to find an unparalleled 
authenticity in new modes of cryptographic deception, it does not seek wholly to detach 
new encryption technologies from earlier efforts to secure the exchange of messages. 
Indeed, Cryptonomicon’s sense of emergent communications must be seen as one that 
interlaces the technologies of the present with those of the recent past. Perhaps the most 
telling examples of this genealogy occur when it seeks to establish code-breaking machines 
of the Second World War as computing technology, rather than simply as 
electromechanical precursors to the devices that we now conceive as computers. The 
Turing Bombe at Bletchley Park (which performed the calculations that allowed the 
Enigma cipher finally to be broken) is seen as an early attempt at mechanized thought, but 
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it is Waterhouse’s use of a room-sized device in Manila to crack Japanese codes that 
provides Cryptonomicon with the clearest image of an embryonic computing intelligence: 
 
The Basement is filled with ETC card machines and with several racks of 
equipment devoid of corporate logos, inasmuch as they were designed and 
largely built by Lawrence Pritchard Waterhouse in Brisbane. When all of 
these things are hooked together in just the right way, they constitute a Digital 
Computer. Like a pipe organ, a Digital Computer is not so much a machine as 
a meta-machine that can be made into any of a number of different machines 
by changing its internal configuration. At the moment, Lawrence Pritchard 
Waterhouse is the only guy in the world who understands the Digital 
Computer well enough to actually do this, though he’s training a couple of 
Comstock’s ETC men to do it themselves. On the day in question, he is 
turning the Digital Computer into a machine for calculating the zeta function 
that he thinks is at the core of the cryptosystem called Azure or Pufferfish 
(Stephenson, 2000, p. 830). 
 
Third: knowledge. What underlies the emergence of the computer during this period – 
and its eventual status as the apparent guarantor of private and authentic communication – 
is a scientific (mathematical, physical, and cryptological) reasoning that endures across 
history. Lawrence Waterhouse’s successes as a cryptanalyst (and, as a consequence, the 
Allied successes against Germany and Japan) are attributed in Cryptonomicon to a 
  
Cryptonomicon and the transnational data haven 11 
theoretical grasp of universal principles that allow a purer, more precise, and better 
functioning knowledge than thought that is limited by the praxis of the moment: 
 
The basic problem for Lawrence was that he was lazy. He had figured out that 
everything was much simpler if, like Superman with his X-ray vision, you just 
stared through the cosmetic distractions and saw the underlying mathematical 
skeleton. Once you found the math in a thing, you knew everything about it, 
and you could manipulate it to your heart’s content with nothing more than a 
pencil and a napkin. He saw it in the bell curve of the silver bars on his 
glockenspiel, saw it in the catenary arch of a bridge and in the capacitor-
studded drum of Atanasoff and Berry’s computing machine. Actually 
pounding on the glockenspiel, riveting the bridge together, or trying to figure 
out why the computing machine wasn’t working were not as interesting to him 
(Stephenson, 2000, p. 8). 
 
Cryptonomicon constantly attributes the Allied victory more to a nerdish facility for pattern 
recognition than to combat heroism or battlefield strategy, and it reveals the debt that 
today’s technologists owe to figures like Turing and Lawrence Waterhouse. However, 
when read primarily as text which locates the informational age in the past as much as the 
present, Cryptonomicon could be seen to offer little more than a revisionist account of 
technology, one which is concerned only to establish a new history of technology and a 
new history of the twentieth century. Stephenson’s novel goes further than such a 
revisionist rewriting, troubling straightforward assumptions about narrative, time, and 
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historicity by drawing attention to a bond between software, hardware, and knowledge that 
cannot simply be attached to modernity. Cryptonomicon might well point to a new order of 
the ages, but this order is one marked neither by an epochal shift towards an informational 
age nor a progressive maturation of incipient technologies. Rather, the novelty of this 
moment is to be found in the emerging sense that information technologies occupy a 
profound, intimate, and enduring place in culture and consciousness. 
 
‘The wreckage of cryptosystems’ 
If Stephenson’s novel provides a more complex sense of history than the one that it 
seemingly promotes, then it also challenges the technotopian positivism that is attached to 
the notion of secure encryption. The hubris that is attached to the notion of an unbreakable 
cipher is revealed in much of the literature on cryptology. Fred Piper and Sean Murphy 
observe that ‘Being unbreakable is a claim that many designers have made for their 
algorithms, usually with disastrous consequences’ (Piper & Murphy, 2002, p. 52), and 
Cryptonomicon echoes this sentiment in an email exchange between Randy and Enoch 
Root (a former military priest and colleague of Bobby Shaftoe, who eventually helps to 
disinter Japanese war gold):  
 
You and I both know, Randy, that the history of crypto is strewn with the 
wreckage of cryptosystems invented by arrogant dilettantes and soon 
demolished by clever codebreakers. You probably suspect that I don’t know 
this – that I’m just another arrogant dilettante (Stephenson, 2000, p. 432). 
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Cryptonomicon repeatedly bears witness to the disasters that have befallen those ‘arrogant 
dilettantes’ who remain confident in the security of their ciphers. The interception and 
deciphering of messages that allowed the US air force to locate and assassinate Admiral 
Yamamoto in 1943, as well as Germany’s catastrophic reliance on the Enigma cipher, 
appear in Stephenson’s text as evidence of cryptographers’ ill-conceived certainty about 
their media.  
Cryptography’s history is shown to be a difficult (and often disastrous) one here, 
but this novel also suggests that current encryption technology offers a level of security that 
can finally resist unsolicited decryption. And yet, Ordo, introduced as an encryption 
software which allows information ‘to remain secret for as long as men are capable of evil’ 
(Stephenson, 2000, p. 55), too fails fully to secure Randy’s messages. While Ordo is seen 
to produce encryption algorithms that defend against current code-breaking technologies, it 
is nevertheless susceptible to other forms of attack. For example, some of Randy’s emails 
are archived on his company’s server in California; when the information stored here 
begins to interest the US government Avi fears that a subpoena could force Epiphyte to 
disclose its decryption keys. A different, and more dramatic, interception of Randy’s data 
occurs when he is imprisoned in the Philippines; falsely charged with drug-smuggling, 
Randy is given his laptop and encouraged to continue working while incarcerated. At this 
point he becomes convinced that he is the victim of ‘Van Eck phreaking’, a (fictional) form 
of electronic surveillance which allows others to ‘pick up the radiation emanating from the 
wire that connects screen buffer to video hardware, and translate it back into a sequence of 
ones and zeroes that can be dumped out onto their own screen’ (Stephenson, 2000, p. 354); 
in other words, what Randy sees on his monitor can also be seen by those surveilling it. 
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Ordo might, then, guarantee email and storage security, but it cannot protect against other 
forms of interception.   
 Passages such as these suggest that Cryptonomicon is not convinced, as it appears to 
be, that communication can be confidential, or that that new technologies have allowed 
cryptology to emerge from its uneasy history of secrets disclosed. While hackers like 
Turing, Lawrence Waterhouse, and Randy Waterhouse need secure cryptosystems, the 
underlying hermeneutic of the novel is that there can be no secure cryptosystem. Since it is 
the breaking of codes and the confounding of cryptographers’ intentions that allows each of 
them to acquire concealed information and to reform the global economic order, 
Cryptonomicon’s less visible concern is to establish language as an uncertain and ultimately 
ungovernable medium. Here, as in all writing, language is seen to be both functional and 
dysfunctional since the coded message allows the act of transmission to occur, but only by 
opening this transmission to interception, hacking, and misappropriation in ways that can 
be neither controlled nor perceived.  
 
Information and the nation-state 
Reading Cryptonomicon against the grain of its apparent investment in the reliability of 
communication and communications technology elicits further questions about this text’s 
ambiguous engagements with the technocultural politics of the twentieth century. In 
Stephenson’s text, not only is language at least double and history an equivocating medium 
of disclosure and concealment, but also, more generally, shifting patterns of information 
exchange are seen to produce cultural uncertainty. Avi’s account of the changing terrain of 
informational control draws attention to this unsettling transformation:   
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‘… as we’ve talked about many times, there are many reasons why different 
governments might want to control the flow of information. China might want 
to institute political censorship, whereas the U.S. might want to regulate 
electronic cash transfers so that they can keep collecting taxes. In the old days 
they could ultimately do this insofar as they owned the cables’. 
‘But now they can’t’, Randy says. 
‘Now they can’t, and this change happened very fast, or at least it 
looked fast to government with its retarded intellectual metabolism, and now 
they are way behind the curve, and scared and pissed off, and starting to lash 
out’ (Stephenson, 2000, pp. 838-9). 
 
No longer is it the case that national governments regulate and restrict the global 
distribution of information. Rather, Cryptonomicon shows, these governments’ 
unprecedented level of national anxiety results from a hitherto-invisible class of 
technologically creative iconoclasts – hackers, maverick programmers, and visionary 
engineers – who bend and manipulate information, stretch the limits of technology and 
redefine the systems with which they work, in the process profoundly reshaping the social, 
political, commercial, and military landscape. The hackerist libertarian ethic that drives 
Cryptonomicon’s narrative forward does not, then, simply seek to establish geeks as the 
emergent priests of a new informationalist age. This text also shows how these characters 
engage in an often subtle, but sometimes brutal, renegotiation of the rules that particular 
nation-states (and the international organizations to which they belong) seek to impose 
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upon those who move information, capital, and themselves across the territories of the 
world.  
In this regard, Stephenson’s text’s fictional and historical interests correspond closely 
with recent theoretical responses to technoculture’s increasingly transnational, and often 
contra-national, trajectories. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1988) perhaps stand at the 
vanguard of those who find social systems, such as the nation-state, constantly encoded, 
decoded, and recoded by machinic assemblages (pp. 424-73). More recently, the work of 
such prominent – and divergent – commentators as Manuel Castells (1996-7), Paul Virilio 
(2002), and Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri (2006) combines to underline the erosion of 
national frontiers by media, communications, and commercial technologies. Closer to 
Cryptonomicon’s thematics, Jacques Derrida’s Politics of Friendship (1997) places the 
question of encryption at the heart of the nation-state’s current anxieties: 
 
A debate… is under way today… between the State and citizen associations 
(all assuredly ‘democrats’ and ‘liberals’) concerned over the right to initiative, 
invention, communication, commerce, and safeguarding privacy…. Today we 
have a State just as ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’, just as concerned over its 
responsibilities, as its citizens, but providing it can maintain its hold on the 
means of protecting internal security and national defence (144). 
 
Here, Derrida points to a conflict that has, in recent years, started to unsettle the democratic 
state’s claims to democratic representation: with the availability of increasingly 
sophisticated encryption technologies (such as PGP) ordinary inhabitants of the digital 
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sphere are now able to shield their data from the gaze of law enforcement agencies. This 
discord is often read as a dispute between the civil liberty of the individual and the 
sovereignty of the state (see, for example, Lessig, 2004), but for Derrida it exposes the 
limits of the representative and liberal nation-state, since such a state will tolerate neither 
the internal nor external negotiation of its national borders.  
Both the threat that data confidentiality poses to national governments and 
governments’ political, military, and informational attempts to restrict high-level 
encryption, are, in Cryptonomicon, seen to shape the twentieth century’s formative 
moments. Encryption technologies of the recent past are shown to play a critical role in the 
defence of the nation: the breaking of German and Japanese codes is given a decisive place 
in the Second World War, since decryption allowed Allied nations to prevail and, as a 
consequence, to retain their national character. Encryption technologies are also revealed as 
one of the most significant threats to both national security and national identity in recent 
years. No longer the sole preserve of governmental research or the outcome of national 
defence strategy, encryption is now serving individuals, non-governmental organizations, 
and corporations; as a consequence, nation-states have recently started both to enhance 
their decryption capabilities and to restrict the distribution of encryption software. When 
Epiphyte’s server is seized we encounter Cryptonomicon’s most forthright response to this 
conflict between data privacy and national governments: ‘The FBI hates and fears strong 
crypto’ (Stephenson, 2000, p. 689). This seizure, Epiphyte’s employees conclude, is one 
outcome of multilateral efforts to restrict the movement of data:  
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‘I guess I’m just being paranoid and sort of assuming that the Dentist 
is somehow collaborating with forces in the U.S. government that are anti-
privacy and anti-crypto’, Randy says. 
… 
‘Not just the U.S. government,’ Cantrell says. ‘The Black Chamber’. 
‘What the hell do you mean by that?’ Doug asks. 
‘There was a high-level conference a couple of weeks ago in 
Brussels. Hastily organized we think. Chaired by Attorney General 
Comstock. Representatives of all the G7 countries and a few others. We 
know people from the NSA were there. People from Internal Revenue. 
Treasury people – Secret Service. Their counterparts in the other countries. 
And a lot of mathematicians known to have been co-opted by the 
government. The U.S. vice president was there. Basically we think that they 
are planning to form some kind of international body to clamp down on 
crypto and particularly on digital money.’ 
‘The International Data Transfer Regulatory Organization’, Tom 
Howard says (Stephenson, 2000, p. 725). 
 
Archive and enigma 
Derrida’s interest in encryption mainly gravitates towards the issue of  democratic nations’ 
undemocratic efforts to protect national territoriality, and this issue is certainly dramatized 
in Cryptonomicon’s open account of the extreme measures that governments will take in 
order to police information. Stephenson’s novel also, however, reflects on certain states’ 
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willingness to engage in the technological renegotiation of their status as nations. 
Epiphyte’s participation in the founding of a data haven (‘the Crypt… Secure, anonymous, 
unregulated data storage’ (Stephenson, 2000, p. 564)) in the (fictional) sultanate of 
Kinakuta provides the clearest example in Cryptonomicon of new technologies’ impact on 
a global order which remains organized around the concept of national identity. Epiphyte’s 
involvement in the Crypt begins as a technological opportunity: its initial role is to install 
the storage systems and establish the network that will allow the Crypt to provide secure 
data hosting. When outlining his plans for the development of the Kinakutan data haven, 
the sultan observes that: 
 
Many Net partisans are convinced that the Net is robust because its lines of 
communication are spread evenly across the planet. In fact… nearly all 
intercontinental Web traffic passes through a small number of choke-points. 
Typically these choke-points are controlled and monitored by local 
governments. Clearly, then, any Internet application that wants to stand free of 
governmental interference is undermined, from the very beginning, by a 
fundamental structure problem…. Bottlenecks are only one of the structural 
barriers to the creation of a free, sovereign, location-independent cyberspace…. 
Another is the heterogeneous patchwork of laws, and indeed of legal systems, 
that address privacy, free speech, and telecoms policy (Stephenson, 2000, pp. 
317-18). 
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Kinakuta’s particular geographical, economic, and political status, the sultan goes on to 
argue, means that it is uniquely placed to decomplexify the relationship between national 
governments and information by allowing the unrestricted flow of data across its borders 
and, as a result, finally create a global network that is truly unrestricted: 
 
‘Time to start over,’ he says. ‘A very difficult thing to do in a large country, 
where laws are written by legislative bodies, interpreted by judges, bound by 
ancient precedents. But this is the Sultanate of Kinakuta and I am the sultan 
and I say that the law here is to be very simple: total freedom of information. I 
hereby abdicate all government power over the flow of data across and within 
my borders. Under no circumstances will any part of this government snoop 
on information flows, or use its power to in any way restrict such flows. That 
is the new law of Kinakuta. I invite you gentlemen to make the most of it’ 
(Stephenson, 2000, pp. 318-19). 
 
Clearly, the sultan here refers to what Cryptonomicon has already established: the 
movement of secure information can acutely conflict with the interests of the nation-state. 
The sultan’s response to this conflict is not that of the G7/G8 nations, which seek 
increasingly to restrict the passage of encrypted data (Cybercrime, 2007), and neither does 
he propose abandoning Kinakuta’s entire legislative apparatus; for him, Kinakuta would 
benefit economically from a data archive that would simply require the dismantling of its 
informational borders.  
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The effects of establishing such an archive extend further than the sultan’s 
observations suggest, however, since the deregulation of Kinakuta’s virtual limits must 
result in further, unpredictable, changes in the shape of this nation. On this matter Derrida’s 
work is again instructive.  
Archives, Derrida tells us, have not always functioned simply as repositories that  
hold the records of the past – that is, as a form of prosthetic memory. Their origins lie in the 
location of the documentary present and in the safeguarding of political power: the 
etymology of ‘archive’, he observes, points to 
  
a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the 
archons, those who commanded. The citizens who thus held and signified 
political power were considered to possess the right to make or to represent 
the law. On account of their publicly recognized authority, it is at their 
home… that official documents are filed. The archons are first of all the 
documents’ guardians. They do not only ensure the physical security of what 
is deposited…. They are also accorded the hermeneutic right and competence. 
They have the power to interpret the archives (Derrida, 1996, p. 2). 
 
Clearly, this relationship between document storage and legal-political governance no 
longer operates in the same way. The places that house documents have ceased to be the 
residences of those in power, and archivists cannot claim exclusive or authoritative 
interpretation of the material for which they are responsible. As Derrida has more recently 
  
Cryptonomicon and the transnational data haven 22 
argued, ‘The archive’s trustees may find themselves, because of the archive’s devious 
structure, dispossessed of all power and all authority over it’ (Derrida, 2006, p. 11). 
Repositories of different sorts figure prominently throughout Cryptonomicon, and this 
text reveals that the relationship between information storage and political governance has 
changed substantially, with new technologies transforming this relationship still further by 
exposing the departure from the nation-state’s regulatory authority in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Bletchley Park (the location of the UK’s cryptanalysis and intelligence 
activities in the Second World War) and Golgotha (the mine that is constructed to house 
Japan’s gold towards the end of the Second World War) provide two examples of 
repositories which, in the middle part of the twentieth century, were established to protect 
the authority of these nations’ archons. When Lawrence Waterhouse is posted to Bletchley 
Park, we encounter his first impressions of this estate as one which lost its attachment to the 
English aristocratic landscape and has instead become an informational hub in the Allied 
efforts to win the war: 
 
The place has been well looked after, but as Waterhouse draws closer, he can 
see black lianas climbing up the brickwork. The root system that he glimpsed 
in the Underground has spread beneath forest and pasture even to this place 
and has begun to throw its neoprene creepers upwards. But this organism is 
not phototropic—it does not grow towards the light, always questing towards 
the sun. It is infotropic. And it has spread to this place for the same reason that 
infotropic humans like Lawrence Pritchard Waterhouse and Dr. Alan 
Mathison Turing have come here, because Bletchley Park has roughly the 
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same situation in the info world as the sun does in the solar system. Armies, 
nations, prime ministers, presidents and geniuses fall around it… (Stephenson, 
2000, p. 143). 
 
Importantly, Cryptonomicon shows that although information – in the form of German and 
Japanese coded messages – is gathered together and held at Bletchley Park, this process of 
data collection is, for the British and Allied military, a protected and secure one. Indeed, the 
very existence of this establishment is described (after the Allies’ Ultra Mega code) as ‘the 
second best kept secret in the world’ (Stephenson, 2000, p. 143). Bletchley Park functions, 
then, as a shielded and safe repository which will, apparently, ensure the survival of 
particular nation-states. 
 Golgotha is elaborately constructed as a subterranean crypt not only to be invisible 
to those in search of it, but also to be impenetrable to those who seek to disinter Japan’s 
purloined gold. Goto Dengo, Golgotha’s chief engineer of this mine, describes the 
consequences for unauthorized intruders who attempt to enter this vault:  
 
‘Anyone who attacks Golgotha will attack from above—to gain horizontal 
access, the distance is too great. This means they will have to tunnel 
downwards, either through fresh rock or through the column of rubble with 
which this ventilation shaft will be filled. In either case, they will discover, 
when they are about halfway down, a stratum of sand, three to five meters in 
depth, spread across the whole area… There are a dozen of these’, he says. 
‘Each one leads to the Lake Yamamoto shaft – so pressurized water will be 
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behind it. The only thing holding them in place right now is tar – obviously 
not enough to hold back the pressure of the lake water. But when we have 
filled these rooms with sand, the sand will hold the manholes in place. But if a 
thief breaks in and removes the sand, the manhole explodes out of its seat and 
millions of gallons of water force their way into his excavation’ (Stephenson, 
2000, p. 661) 
  
Just as Bletchley Park is built as an informational archive which serves those who 
command Allied nations, so the physical invulnerability of Golgotha is, then, seen to ensure 
the economic security of post-war Japan. 
Even these most complex attempts build the fortunes of the nation-state around 
various modes of secure storage are, however, compromized in Cryptonomicon. Such 
repositories, supposedly ordered instruments in the service of the archons of the nation-
state, are at times seen by this novel to require interpretation by those who do not govern. 
Bletchley Park, for example, works not as an intelligence archive which is accessed and 
controlled by Churchill or Roosevelt but as a facility in which interpretation has become the 
responsibility of the state’s functionaries: 
 
It is early in November of 1942 and a simply unbelievable amount of shit is 
going on, all at once, everywhere. Zeus himself would not be able to sort it all 
out, not even if he mobilized the caryatids—tell them never mind what we 
told you, just drop those loads. Temples collapsing everywhere, like 
spyglasses, he’d send those caryatids—and any naiads and dryads he could 
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scare up—to library school, issue them green visors, dress them in the prim 
asexual uniforms of the OPAMS, the Olympian Perspective Archive 
Management Service, put them to work filling out three-by-five cards round 
the clock. Get them to use some of that vaunted caryatid steadfastness to tend 
Hollerith machines and ETC card readers. Even then, Zeus would probably 
still lack a handle on the situation. He’d be so pissed off he would hardly 
know which hubristical mortals to fling his thunderbolts at, nor which pinup 
girls and buck privates to molest. Lawrence Pritchard Waterhouse is as 
Olympian as anyone right now. Roosevelt and Churchill and the few others on 
the Ultra Mega list have the same access, but they have other cares and 
distractions. They can’t wander around the data flow capital of the planet, 
snooping over translators’ shoulders and reading the decrypts as they come, 
chunkity-chunkity whirr, out of the Typex machines. They cannot trace 
individual threads of the global narrative at their whim… (Stephenson, 2000, 
p. 162) 
 
Stephenson’s text attaches a similar loss of political – narrative – authority to Golgotha. In 
order to protect the integrity of this crypt, Dengo and his fellow engineers (those who know 
its secrets) are, upon its completion, condemned to death when they are sealed within it. 
Dengo’s escape, and his subsequent disclosure of its location both to an international group 
of conspirators (including Enoch Root and Lawrence Waterhouse) at the end of the Second 
World War and, later in the novel, to Avi and Randy, mean that it ceases both to exist 
covertly and to function securely. Because of this compromized existence, the gold that is 
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housed there fails to protect either Japan’s economic interests or its narrative of national 
identity. 
Cryptonomicon also explores the ways in which today’s archives, which 
increasingly take the form of networked storage, are moving regulatory power further from 
those who manage the social sphere. The sultan of Kinakuta is acutely aware of this transfer 
of power when he describes his country’s data haven as one which requires the abnegation 
of governmental authority: ‘Our policies concerning free speech, telecommunications and 
cryptography have evolved from a series of simple, rational decisions. But they are today so 
complex that no one can understand them, even in one single country, to say nothing of all 
countries taken together’ (Stephenson, 2000, p. 318). However, the consequences of such 
policies for Kinakuta’s national autonomy are equally complex: although the Crypt brings 
economic benefits to Kinakuta, it must also result in a corresponding loss of the sultan’s 
political power; or, in a more Derridean idiom, the Crypt might well emerge as an 
expression of monarchical authority, but this archive at the same time requires the archon to 
renounce hermeneutic authority. 
Derrida does not read this functional transformation of the archive – this transfer of 
power from one interpretative body to another – as the outcome of a deliberative drive for 
political justice. For Derrida, archives produce conceptual uncertainty as much as they 
allow the secure location of information: archives are ‘at once institutive and conservative’ 
(Derrida, 2000, p. 7), since the consigning of documents necessarily changes the 
significance of that material. Archives preserve the status of documents, but they also 
subject these documents to the modifying effects of storage technologies and open 
information to further interpretation. It is because of this ambiguous function, Derrida 
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argues, that the precise and enduring meaning of archived information cannot be 
guaranteed: ‘The archive’, he writes, ‘always works… against itself’ (Derrida, 1996, p. 12), 
The Crypt’s relationship to both Kinakuta and Epiphyte exemplifies the ways in 
which archives both allow preservation and provoke transformation. The data haven is 
located on Kinakuta because of this nation’s particular qualities, and yet this new 
technology for the storage and distribution of information leaves Kinakuta’s future 
uncertain. Kinakuta embraces the technological opportunities that are offered by a data 
haven, but it can do so only by modifying itself as a sovereign nation. Since the Crypt will 
allow transnational groups further to disregard national and international law (and thus 
further diminish the influence of nations), Kinakuta’s national status must eventually suffer 
from its technological enterprise. Writing for itself an impossible future, Kinakuta 
demonstrates how even those nations that renounce their powers to regulate data are 
threatened by advanced encryption.  
Compounding this drift from established modes of collective belonging is 
Epiphyte’s discovery of Japan’s buried war gold. This gold is discovered not as a result of 
Epiphyte’s normal business interests, but because of Randy’s extracurricular research into 
his grandfather’s archive of wartime codes (which, when decrypted, reveal the location of 
the mine that houses Japan’s gold). In other words, it is an unknown and unforeseeable 
episode in Randy’s family history that leads Epiphyte to rethink the Crypt’s purpose. 
Rather than simply taking the gold and retreating into personal wealth, Randy and Avi see 
in it the opportunity for founding a digital currency that would be securely located in the 
Crypt, beyond the reach of governmental legislation and not tied to the bullion depository 
of a particular nation-state. As one reviewer of Stephenson’s novel remarks: 
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Randy Waterhouse and his cypherpunk business partners are about to do 
what everyone else has only talked about: open the first true offshore data 
haven on a remote Pacific atoll. If they can launch a new electronic currency 
backed by a few hundred metric tons of Nazi gold, well, that's an even more 
efficient way to wreck those antediluvian nation states (McCullagh, 1999).  
 
This review’s phrasing hyperbolizes Cryptonomicon’s response to the recoding of the 
nation-state by both existing and fictional technologies, but it does underline emerging 
technologies’ deleterious impact upon national identity. Crucially, what Cryptonomicon 
further reveals is that these consequences cannot be envisaged, even by those who 
introduce, promote, and manage them. The Crypt and all that it involves (a transnational 
digital currency, unrestricted data storage and distribution, secure encryption) is, at the end 
of Cryptonomicon, set to reshape the distribution of political and economic power across 
the globe. But this archive (like others, Derrida might observe) is one that is already 
operating in ways that were not anticipated.  
 
The Global? 
How are we to account for the recent interest in cryptography? Evidence of recent 
cinematic and literary interest in the technological protection of information is to be found 
not only in Stephenson’s novel, but also in Robert Harris’s 1995 novel Enigma (and its 
filming by Michael Apted in 2001), in Dan Brown’s 1996 Digital Fortress, and in Fox’s 
five seasons of 24. It is perhaps no accident that this interest developed at the moment when 
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several forms of cultural anxiety merge: fallout from the millennial fear that technology is 
making humanity’s future uncertain, greater demand for secure systems for email and 
online commerce, and the fear that other regions of the world are becoming unreadable. In 
order to overcome these anxieties, we persuade ourselves that our secrets are inaccessible to 
others, and we remain confident that greater intellectual and technological sophistication 
allows our official representatives to decipher others’ secrets. But who is this ‘we’? 
 Stephenson’s text suggests that these cultural anxieties result from a questionable 
understanding of technology’s history and function. Cryptonomicon suggests that both the 
anxious disavowal and the clamorous embracing of today’s technologies fail to perceive the 
shaping of the past by information (and especially cryptological) technologies. More 
importantly, it suggests that the concept of ‘we’ is being profoundly reinvented in ways that 
are now troubling the nation as a system of collective belonging. It does so not by 
endorsing globalist pronouncements on the nation-state’s terminal decline, nor by 
suggesting that governments will prevail in the face of the technocultural threat. Instead, 
this novel shows how technologies are in a process of constant negotiation with the 
institutions of the nation-state. Data storage and distribution technologies here open up 
planetary-wide communication traffic but, in a world that is not yet global, they draw upon 
the economic, material, and intellectual resources of the nation-state at the very moment 
that they challenge national borders and work to divest nations of their regulatory authority. 
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1 The name of this software – Virgil’s ‘a new order of the ages’ – is, of course, most 
associated with the reverse side of The Great Seal of the United States. Ironically 
appropriated here, it names the cryptographic tool used to resist the intrusive gaze of the 
nation-state. 
2 The description of PGP by William Crowell (Deputy Director of the USA’s National 
Security Agency) suggests similarities between it and Stephenson’s fictional Ordo: ‘If all 
the personal computers in the world – approximately 260 million computers – were to be 
put to work on a single PGP encrypted message, it would take on average an estimated 12 
million times the age of the universe to break a single message’ (Cited in Singh, 1999, p. 
317). 
